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The minority shareholder in a modem corporation is essentially
without a voice in the management of the corporation. 24 The one
remaining device with which he can protect his investment from
the self-dealing of those in control is through a shareholders deriva-
tive action on behalf of the corporation. Through such an action
he can enforce the fiduciary duties owed by the management. The
courts, by permitting the expansion of the business judgment rule
into the traditional enclave of the director's "duty of loyalty," are
removing a substantial portion of this protection. In most situations
where directors enter into such a transaction, they will be able to
put forth plausible business reasons in its support, but they may not
always be able to satisfy the demands of undivided loyalty.
REED JOHNSTON, JR.
Criminal Law-Committed Patient's Right to Treatment in
Public Mental Hospitals
Nineteenth century attitudes toward insanity were responsible
for the conception of a lunatic asylum as an institution for the public
safety. The conditions in the asylums reflected the wild beast no-
tion of mental illness' -- the essential function of the asylum was
Id. at 677.
In the analogous situation where the directors contract with their own
corporation, or where corporations with common directors contract to-
gether, the majority rule calls for close scrutiny of the contract to insure
its fairness. See Bank of United States v. Cuthbertson, 67 F.2d 182 (4th
Cir. 1933), cert. denied 291 U.S. 665 (1933); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 44 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Wash. 1942), ajffd 139 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.
1942); Tucson Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Inv. Corp., 74 Ariz.
163, 245 P.2d 423 (1952); Kennedy v. Emerald Coal & Coke Co., 28
Del. Ch. 405, 42 A.2d 398 (1944); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43
N.E.2d 18 (1942).
24 The modern large American corporation enjoys almost complete
independence from its stockholders, the principal source of external
intereference. While lip service is always paid to democratic con-
trol by the owners, it is recognized in practice that any extensive
and effective interference by stockholders in management would be
exceedingly damaging.
GALBRAITu, EcoxomIc DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE, 65-66 (1962).
Ownership of wealth without appreciable control and control of
wealth without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical out-
come of corporate development.
BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CO1RORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTT, 69
(1933).
'Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1742).
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custody, the doctor was the keeper. However, a recent case ques-
tions the custody-function theory and poses a dilemma over the
civil rights of patients in public mental hospitals: may the state
involuntarily commit an individual and yet neglect to provide
therapy in the hospital, or, if overcrowding and understaffing
make therapy impractical, is the patient entitled to his liberty in spite
of danger to himself or the community? In Rouse v. Camerop
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a pa-
tient involuntarily committed after being acquitted by reason of
insanity on a misdemeanor charge has a right to treatment, on the
basis of a District of Columbia statute which provides: "a person
hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his
hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and
treatment."3
Rouse had been committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Four
years4 passed and he brought habeas corpus proceedings in the dis-
trict court, contending that he was receiving no treatment, or al-
ternatively, that he had recovered his mental health and was en-
titled to release. The district court refused to hear the treatment
issue on the ground of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court
of Appeals remanded for a hearing, holding that if Rouse was not
receiving treatment, he was in custody in violation of a federal
statute and was entitled to habeas corpus relief.5 Appropriate relief,
the court indicated, might be to remand the patient to custody and
-373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'D.C. CODE § 21-562 (Supp. V. 1966).
' He was acquitted of carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor
carrying a maximum sentence of one year. D.C. CoDE A x. § 22-3215
(1961).
'The statute created a right to therapy. Therefore mere custodial care is
unlawful. The court indicated that the statute required only that the pa-
tient receive some therapy representing a good faith effort at individualized
treatment of his disorder. Whether so called milieu therapy-mere pres-
ence in the controlled environment of the hospital--complies with the
statute, depends, the court said, upon its suitability to individual patient
needs. 373 F.2d at 459. It should be noted that the standards of proof in
establishing the inadequacy of particular therapy will be similar to those
used in medical malpractice suits, with which the courts are familiar.
Whether individual patients will be able to bring these standards to bear on
their situations, however, may depend upon their financial resources. It is
to be presumed that hospital psychiatrists will be predisposed to testify that
milieu therapy is adequate in a given case. The patient then must come
forward with his own expert testimony, which will involve a private diag-
nosis. Quaere whether the court will be inclined to rubber stamp the judg-
ment of the hospital psychiatrist in cases where the patient is unable to
put on his own expert testimony?
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direct the hospital to begin treatment, or, if the opportunity for
treatment had been exhausted, to release the patient conditionally
or unconditionally.
6
Since the decision rested on a statute, rather than on consti-
tutional grounds,' its implications beyond the District of Columbia
depend in a formal sense on the existence of a similar statute wher-
ever the issue may be litigated. While, apparently, there is no
statute in other federal jurisdictions," the statutes of thirteen states
expressly recognize a right to treatment, and in twenty-four addi-
tional states the statutes could be construed to permit the result
reached in Rouse.' With regard to judicial decisions, Rouse is a
case of first impression.
Old. at 458.
'An exhaustive treatment of the constitutional issues is beyond the
scope of this note, but a few observations can be made. The court in Rouse
noted that there were serious constitutional objections to confinement without
therapy, but decided the case on the basis of the statute. The constitutional
justification for compulsory commitment is grounded in two concepts: the
general police power of the state to protect society against breaches of the
peace, and the doctrine of the state as parens patriae. See Ross, Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill, 56 MicH. L. RFv. 945, 955 (1959). Summary
commitment on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity does not rest
on a finding of present insanity, or dangerousness, and therefore cannot be
predicated on the police power. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705
(1962). The theoretical basis is the parens patriae concept, which requires
that only the interests of the defendant be taken into account. And only
therapy, not mere custody, is in the defendant's interests.
The argument can be made that absent therapy involuntary hospitaliza-
tion is tantamount to imprisonment, which the court could not constitutionally
impose on a not guilty verdict. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950
(D.C. Cir. 1960). Second, the argument can be made that any involuntary
hospitalization without the benefit of therapy represents incarceration be-
cause of a status-being mentally ill-and as such is a cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the eighth amendment under the doctrine of
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1960). See Driver v. Hinnant, 356
F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50
(D.C. Cir. 1966). See 44 N.C.L. REV. 818 (1966).
' Senator Robert Kennedy has introduced a bill applicable to federal
jurisdictions other than the Distirct of Columbia which includes a provision
identical to the Rose statute. S. 3689, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4249(b) (1966).
'Least typical (two states) and most like the District of Columbia
statute, are the statutes which create an unqualified right to treatment.
IL. REV. STAT. ch. 9132, § 100-7 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 2
(1954). A second group of statutes (eleven states) expressly recognizes
a right to treatment, but with the qualification stated in, for example, the
Ohio statute: "Every patient shall be entitled . . . to the extent that facili-
ties, equipment and personnel are available, to medical care and treatment."
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (Supp. 1966). See also GA. CODE ANN. §
88-1614 (1963); IDAHO CODE: ANN. § 66-344 (Supp. 1965); ME. Rav. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34, § 2252 (1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.840 (1962); N.J. Rv.
STAT. § 30:4-24.1 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13 (1954); N.D.
1967] :
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Assuming the substantive law recognizes a right to therapy on
statutory or constitutional grounds, there is the question of choice
of remedy. Causes alleging illegal or abusive confinement are typi-
cally litigated on habeas corpus or in an action under the federal
civil rights statute. The issue in Rouse was presented in a petition
for habeas corpus. The relief which the District of Columbia court
indicated could be given on remand reflects its policy of treating a
petition for habeas corpus according to its substantive merit-if it
substantively merits injunctive relief, for example, it will be treated
as a petition for an injunction.1 On the other hand, the weight of
the federal cases follow the common law rule that habeas corpus
will only issue to procure release of the petitioner from confine-
ment." This would preclude relief in the form of compulsory
processes against the hospital. In between these polar extremes are
several federal courts which have developed a special circumstances
CENT. CODE § 25-03-18 (1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-306 (Supp. 1966);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 25-70 (Supp.
1965). A third group (eighteen states) creates a duty on the part of re-
sponsible authorities to provide therapy, rather than creating a patient right.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.010 (1962); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-521 (Supp.
1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-229 (Supp. 1965); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 17-211 (1960); IOWA CODE ANN. § 225.15 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-2927 (Supp. 1965); Ky. RFV. STAT. § 210.040(4) (1962); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 59, § 18 (1957) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.802 (Supp. 1966) ;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 246.012 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 38-103
(1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-307 (1958); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:6(a)
(1964); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 22; S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-922
(1962); S.D. CODE § 30.0202 (1960); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5547-70 (1958); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2503 (Supp. 1965). North Caro-
lina provides that it is the duty of "duly constituted authorities of the State
Hospitals ... for the mentally ill to receive all such mentally ill persons as
shall be committed to said institutions ... and to treat and care properly for
the same until discharged." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-89 (1964). A fourth
group of statutes (six states) state that the maintenance of adequate medical
care is either the state policy or is the purpose in establishing institutions
such as the state mental hospital. COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-23 (1964);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1359 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. § 426.010 (1965);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 26-1-1 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-1A-1
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.005 (1957). In addition, three states charge
the responsible authorities with the duty of making a periodic inquiry into
the medical care being received by mental patients. CALIF. WELFARE AND
INST. CODE § 6621; HAWAii REv. LAWS § 81-13 (1955); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 6902 (1953).
1"E.g., Miller v. Overhouser, 206 F.2d 415, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In
accord is the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. E.g., Roberts v.
Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963).
"E.g., Miller v. Gladden, 341 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1965); Haskins v.
U.S., 292 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1961); McGann v. Taylor, 289 F.2d 820 (10th
Cir. 1961); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952); Sarshik v.
Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944).
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rule. 2 The problem of limited usage of habeas corpus can be avoided
entirely, however, by bringing an action under the federal civil
rights statute," in which Congress has expressly provided that the
federal court may grant any relief available under federal law, and
any relief available under the law of the forum state if federal relief
is found to be inadequate.14 The only necessary allegation is that
the patient is being denied a federally protected civil right by persons
acting under color of state or territorial law. 5 In a number of
" E.g., Harris v. Settle, 322 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1963). In this case it
was held that compulsory processes would issue on habeas corpus against
prison officials only when the alleged mistreatment amounted to a cruel
and unusual punishment. In McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), the
United States Supreme Court followed the common law rule, holding that
the writ of habeas corpus would only issue when a resolution favorable to
the petitioner would result in his release from confinement. This view was
reaffirmed in Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1959), with four justices dis-
senting. There is reason to believe that the present Court would overrule
McNally if given the opportunity to do so. One member of the Ellis majority
(the majority opinion was per curiam) has been replaced by Justice Fortas,
who normally votes with the four Justice Ellis minority. The dissenters in
Ellis argued strongly for a more flexible approach to the use of habeas
corpus. Id. at 577, 595. Since McNally the Court has taken an increasingly
liberal view of the latitude allowable to a litigant on habeas corpus. See
44 N.C.L. REv. 844 (1966). At the Court of Appeals level, McNally was
not followed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Coffin v. Reichard,
143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), where it was held that compulsory processes
would issue on habeas corpus in the case of abusive, but lawful, detention
of prisoners. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia later developed their own rules. See
note 10 supra and accompanying text. The position of the courts which
do not follow the McNally view is based on the language of 28 U.S.C. §
2243 (1959), which provides that on a habeas corpus petition the "court
shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter
as law and justice require."
" REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
" REv. STAT. § 722 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964). See, e.g., Sherrod
v. Pink Hat Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
" REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). Several courts
hold that this section may not be used to circumvent the exhaustion of state
remedies requirement of habeas corpus. E.g., Johnson v. Walker, 317 F.2d
418 (5th Cir. 1963). Other courts hold that state remedies need not be
exhausted as a condition precedent to bringing suit. E.g., Cooper v.
Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir. 1950). Another view is that state
administrative remedies must be exhausted. E.g., McKissick v. Durham,
176 F. Supp. 3 (M.D.N.C. 1959). It would seem that the same considera-
tions of comity which underlie the habeas corpus exhaustion of state remedies
requirement would apply to suits under this section. A novel view is to
permit a Section 1983 claim for denial of a civil right to be brought up on
a habeas corpus petition. U.S. ex. rel. McCode v. Pennsylvania, 246 F. Supp.
801 (E.D. Pa. 1965). Only one court has expressly held that a habeas corpus
petition cannot be converted into a Section 1983 claim. U.S. v. Bibb, 249
F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1957). Note that the District of Columbia is a territory
19671
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actions brought under this section, prisoners denied medical treat-
ment by prison authorities have secured injunctive relief.16
Whichever procedure is employed, if release from the hospital
on the basis of lack of therapy is sought, the court must face a
perplexing problem. It would seem that the real power to force
change in the policies of institutions such as St. Elizabeth's lies in
the court's authority to order the release of patients whose presence
in the community is unwanted.Y That a maximum effective use of
judicial power comprehends thwarting a basic objective of the
criminal law-the segregation of dangerous persons-is reflected
in the cases in which the United States Supreme Court has asserted
its control over state criminal procedure. The Court's ever in-
creasing use of the exclusionary rule in reversing state convictions
figuratively raised the spectre of emptying the prisons. The states'
response was to require that police respect the federal constitution
as least so far as their practices related to the admissibility of evi-
dence. This response was gradual and in proportion to the stringency
of the exclusionary rule ordained at a given time. A classic example
is the events surrounding the line of cases dealing with the admis-
sibility of confessions, running from Brown v. Mississipp' s to
Miranda v. Arizona.'" It is accurate to say that only through the
within the meaning of Section 1983. E.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,
31 (1948)."8E.g., Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1966); Talley v.
Stephens, 247 F. Supp 683 (D. Ark. 1965). The textual discussion is not
intended to be an exhaustive treatment of the remedies open to patients
denied therapy. There are a number of possibilities: (1) state habeas
corpus, where available, based on the state statute, or state or federal con-
stitution; (2) federal habeas corpus, based on a federal statute or the federal
constitution; (3) where the patient is in a federal or territorial hospital,
an action under Section 1983, or a Section 1985 action for money damages;
(4) a petition for an injunction or mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1948) ; (5) tort suits for money damages against state or federal officials.
E.g., U.S. v. Munz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). For federal jurisdiction over
Section 1983 claims see 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1962).
See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
18297 U.S. 436 (1936).
'o 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The confession exclusionary rule moved from
an initial reliance on factual unreliability, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547 (1941), to an abandonment of any causal requirement between police
conduct and the voluntariness of the confession, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944). Yet twenty-four years after the Court had, in Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 436 (1936), established the principle that physical
abuse was ground for exclusion, the Court in Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1960), found it necessary to reverse because the suspect had been deprived
of sleep. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963), abandoned the volun-
tariness rule altogether, and in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
[Vol. 45
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power to haunt the public mind with freed criminals-however
tragic the consequences-could the Court have had any impact at
all on state practices.20 So too, it seems that the most effective route,
perhaps the only effective route, to achieving policy changes in
public mental hospitals by judicial leverage is simply to order the
release of patients who are confined without therapy.
As it was not material to disposition of the issue at hand, the
Rouse decision did not specify when the District of Columbia court
would consider release appropriate relief for patients denied therapy.
The commitment and release of persons acquitted of a crime on
the basis of insanity is governed by statutory standards in the Dis-
trict of Columbia." Commitment is mandatory and summary;
when release is sought the statute puts the burden on the patient
to prove that he has recovered his mental health, and will not in
the reasonably foreseeable future be dangerous to himself or others.
The court has interpreted the dangerous propensity element to mean
dangerousness which is related to a mental illness.22 In analyzing
the statute, Professors Goldstein and Katz have stated that the
optimum allocation of decision making power, as between the psy-
chiatrist and the court, is for the psychiatrist to determine whether
the patient's mental health has been restored, and what propensities
he has, and for the court to determine if such propensities are
sufficiently dangerous to warrant further hospitalization.2" Their
position is that the court is better equipped than the psychiatrist
the Court made it impossible for the states to admit any confession unless a
detailed procedure had been first followed in the police station. So the
Court has moved from a concern with prejudice to the rights to particular
defendants to laying down a code of criminal procedure for the states to
follow. Query whether the Court would have tread the same path had all
reports of police station physical abuse, for example, ceased after Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 436 (1936). The point is that the Court has found
it necessary to take extreme measures to achieve minimum objectives.
"0 Consider, for example, that in New York it is a misdemeanor for a
public officer to delay taking a person under arrest before a magistrate
N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1844. The statute has been in effect for eighty-six years,
yet not a single prosecution has been reported under it. On the other hand,
immediately after the Miranda exclusionary rule was decided, police officers
in Los Angeles County, California, were instructed to warn all criminal
suspects of their rights before questioning them. YOUNGEm, DoRAno-Mi-
RANDA SuRvEY (1966).
2 D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 24-301(d), (e) (1961).
22 Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
28 Goldstein and Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, Some Observa-
tions on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity,
70 YALE L.J. 227, 231 (1960).
1967]
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to sense the needs of the community with respect to the risks the
community is willing to take.
What will result when Rouse v. Cameron is superimposed on
this commitment-release scheme is unforeseeable. It seems unlikely
that a court can force basic policy changes by the use of compulsory
processes against the hospital authorities on a case by case basis.
The money, personnel and facilities necessary for therapy are simply
not available. 4 And an order to the director of St. Elizabeth's
requiring him to provide individualized treatment for the entire
patient population would clearly be beyond the realistic limits of
judicial power. Unless there is legislative initiative, it seems that a
court will be faced with the knowledge that the only way to realize
results-as the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court with the
exclusionary rule demonstrates-is to turn patients denied therapy
loose on the community. Presumably, in individual cases, the court
will make a determination of dangerousness, and go through some
process of balancing the interests involved.
SAMUEL HOLLINGSWORTH, JR.
Income Tax-Original Issue Discount
In a never-articulated effort to prevent tax avoidance,' the
courts have engrafted a number of judicial concepts on the statutory
definition of capital assets in spite of the all-inclusive language used
by Congress.2 By far the most famous, or infamous, of these is
the assignment of income doctrine3 which had its true beginning in
"The opinion of the American Psychiatric Association is that no tax-
supported institution in the United States can be considered adequately
staffed. U.S. SURGEON GENERAL'S AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON PLANNING FOR
MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES, PLANNING OF FACILITIES FOR MENTAL
HEALTH SERvIcES 39 (1961).
' Bowden, Assignment of Itcome Reconsidered, 20 TAxES 67 (1942).
' The Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221, defines a capital asset as all
property unless it falls within one of five specifically excluded groups. Some
courts have limited the class of preferred capital gains property by straining
to find an exclusionary category satisfied. See, e.g., Hollis v. United States,
121 F. Supp 191 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
'See generally, Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income, 17 TAX L. Rnv.
293 (1962). Another equally clear area of judicial legislation was estab-
lished by Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). There
the Court conceded that futures contracts which were "an integral part of
its [the company's] business" did not come within the exclusionary clauses
[Vol. 45
